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Abstract: The agricultural sectors’ contribution to the provision of energy is a central issue 
in Horizon 2020 strategies and has shaped the public and research debates on the future of 
the bioeconomy. The common agricultural policy (CAP) has been one of the main drivers of 
farmers’ behavioural changes and represents the main agricultural policy instrument to 
address viability of rural areas and maintaining the profitability of the agricultural sector.  
To contribute to the ongoing policy debate towards CAP reform, this paper will provide an 
empirical model to simulate the impact of an alternative CAP mechanism on the provision 
of renewable energy. By applying a dynamic mathematical programming model, the paper 
tests the impact that new policy measures will have on the provision of a second-generation 
of bio fuel crops that represent a relevant option for Tuscan farmers. Results show that CAP 
reform positively impacts the supply of energy crops mainly due to the introduction of 
greening payments, which allows an enlarging of crop diversification. Model results stress 
also the income stabilisation effects of energy production introduction at farm level, due to 
reduction of farm exposure to market prices fluctuations.  
Keywords: common agricultural policy; energy production; farm household model; 
mathematical programming model; biogas; short rotation coppice; real options  
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1. Introduction 
The increased use of fossil fuels is among the major causes for the growing emissions of greenhouse 
gases (GHGs) [1]. Cutting GHG emissions would help to moderate climate risks in the 21st century and 
contribute to climate-resilient pathways for sustainable development [2]. The energy supply sector is the 
largest contributor to global GHG emissions; thus, replacing fossil fuels with renewable energies (REs), 
such as bioenergy, can lower GHGs emissions [3]. When properly designed in terms of biomass choice 
and production methods, bioenergy crop systems can improve energy security, as well as lead to 
favourable carbon and energy balances and reduce GHG emissions [4]. 
Agroenergy is the function of agriculture that refers to the use of agricultural products, such as energy 
crops or livestock by-products, as RE sources. Thus, agro-energy contributes to the multifunctionality 
of farms [5] and can increase and stabilise farmers’ incomes [6]. Agroenergy combines the return on 
investment with favourable effects in terms of food security, rural development, new start-ups, 
employment, land care and protection, sustainable management of agro forestry resources, local  
self-reliance, biodiversity conservation, climate change mitigation and improved energy supply and 
security [7–9]. A weakness of the cultivation of biomass is land use competition with food crops [10].  
The European Union (EU) promotes bioenergy [11] and supports agroenergy (i.e., bioenergy 
produced from cultivated feedstocks) via the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) [12]. The CAP has 
been among the main drivers for change in farmers’ behaviour as well as the main instrument to address 
the viability of rural areas and to support the profitability of the agricultural sector. The CAP is structured 
in two pillars. Pillar I covers market intervention measures and direct decoupled payments to farmers. 
Pillar II is directed at rural development policy and is co-financed between the EU budget and the 
Member States; it is based on strategic objectives set at EU level, i.e., competitiveness, modernisation, 
environmental impact and social issues, which are implemented through national or regional  
multi-annual rural development programmes (RDPs). In Italy, the RDPs are implemented on a regional 
level and move from each region’s priorities.  
On 1 January 2015 the new CAP came into force. Both pillars have been adjusted to be in line with 
“Europe 2020” agenda, which prioritises the shift to affordable, secure, and green energy. Within that 
framework, agriculture has become a prominent supplier of REs. To the best of our knowledge, the 
impact of new CAP’s measures on the production of feedstocks for biogas production in Italy has yet to 
be investigated. We had worked on this paper with the purpose of bridging that gap. Primarily, the paper 
attempts to assess the impact of new measures under the CAP 2014–2020 on introduction of the main 
available investment in energy production: introduction of Short Rotation Coppice (SRC) and 
implementation of biogas plants on farm. Thus, we propose a scenario analysis simulating the 
introduction of both the new basic payment scheme (BPS), with the regional model for endowment 
allocation, under Pillar I and two measures of RDP 2014–2020 that support the diffusion of agroenergy. 
We tested our model on the farms of the province of Pisa, one of the 10 Provinces of Tuscany and the 
one that shows the lowest diffusion of SRC and biogas plants, in spite of very large amount of available 
land that can be allocated to energy production [13]. Our results suggest that the new CAP can boost the 
agroenergy sector in Tuscany, thanks to the agro-environmental climatic payments and to the co-funding 
measure, which makes investments in biogas plants more affordable. Entering the agroenergy market 
can peg farmers’ incomes, making it less dependent on the fluctuations in market prices.  
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The paper is structured as follows. In the first section, we set agroenergy within the European strategy 
addressing bioeconomy. Section two is dedicated to the chosen methodology and introduces the dynamic 
model based on mathematical programming that we propose for testing the impact of the CAP’s 
measures under both pillars. The third section encompasses the description of the tested farm household 
model, i.e., model specification, sample selection, and scenario analysis. The following paragraph is for 
showing and discussing our results. We conclude by summarising our findings, highlighting the 
strengths and weaknesses of our work, suggesting recommendations for policymakers, and providing 
inputs for further research. 
2. Overview of the Agroenergy Framework within the EU Strategy towards Bioeconomy and  
the CAP 2014–2020 
One the aims of “Horizon 2020”, the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation of the EU 
is to tackle the “Energy Challenge” by establishing a bioeconomy in Europe. The term bioeconomy 
concerns the substitution of fossil fuels with biofuels in a number of production processes of goods and 
services (e.g., power and heating) [14]. The bioeconomy encompasses the agricultural production of 
biomass as well as its conversion into agroenergy [15]. 
In 2008, the EU adopted its first package on climate and energy measures setting 2020 targets.  
The energy and climate change objectives for 2020 were to reduce GHG emissions by 20% compared to 
1990 levels, to increase the share of RE to 20% and to make 20% improvement in energy efficiency. 
Official data on key achievements of the “2020 strategy” date 2012. The 2020 strategy had allowed 18% 
reduction in GHG emissions. Further reductions by 24% and 32% are expected by 2020 and 2030, 
respectively. The share of RE with respect to the overall amount of energy consumed had increased by 
13% and is projected to reach 21% by 2020 and 24% by 2030. By 2020, bioenergy is expected to increase 
with 44% compared to 2010 levels, with 90% growth in bio-based electricity, 22% growth in heat from 
biomass and 129% in biofuels [16]. The EU growth strategy towards 2020 sets the background to the 
CAP 2014–2020. Pillar I of the CAP can help REs to spread; that is suggested by research works focused 
on the CAP ante-2013. Supporting and stabilising farmers’ incomes, the single payment scheme (SPS) 
had raised both the profitability of agriculture [17] and the demand for marginal land (see [18] for an 
analysis of the changes in land demand due to introduction of a new entitlement model). Single farm 
payment (SFP) had helped farmers to overcome risk aversion behaviours addressing issues such as 
differentiating the production by introducing energy crops or investing in biogas plants ([6,19]. Thanks 
to SFP, farmers could invest in a timelier manner [20]. Short rotation forestry (SRF) had provided 
farmers with direct payments based on medium to long-term contracts, which could reduce farmers’ 
exposure to the fluctuations of market prices. Thus, introducing a short rotation coppice (SRC), such as 
willow, could be strategic for a farmer to increase his firm’s utility [6].  
Moving to the CAP 2014–2020, the two main novelties concern the multi-purpose targeting and the 
model for endowment allocation.  
Concerning the first pillar, the Italian payment system shifts from “hystorical” to “regionalised”, and 
relies on a system of multi-purpose payments with seven components. Four components are the most 
significant: (i) basic payment scheme (BPS) (58% national ceiling); (ii) greening payment (30% national 
ceiling); (iii) coupled payment (11% national ceiling); and payment to young farmers (1% national 
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ceiling). Farmers are eligible if they received a SPS payment in 2013 or can provide evidence,  
such as receipts or accounts, that they were farmers in 2013. The “greening” is the most prominent 
component [21]; its primary purposes are boosting crops diversification and maintaining natural and 
semi-natural crop systems in Europe’s rural landscapes [22]. 
Endowments are allocated on a regional, rather than historical, basis with partial convergence. 
Historical entitlements are extinguished and new ones allocated, one entitlement being awarded  
for each hectare of land. In Italy, thepayment system  relies on the so-called "Irish model", which is 
based on the partial convergence mechanism. [23] highlighted five main features of this new model: (i) 
all cultivations are eligible (e.g., SRC, energy crops); (ii) 2015 is the reference year for the basic payment 
(BP); (iii) farmers’ payments per hectare will be at least 60% of the national average BP, until 2019; (vi) 
the highest possible reduction of farmer payments will be 30% of the BP in 2015; (v) farmers whose 
BPs are between 60% and 90% of the national average will get an increase in their payments equal to 
one third of the difference between BPs and national average. According to a simulation by [23], the 
average BP will be 179 € per hectare, that is 58% of the total payment. Only farms that fulfil the cross-
compliance requirements are eligible for the payments. Farmers are committed to comply with statutory 
management requirements (SMRs) and minimum requirements to maintain land in good agricultural and 
environmental conditions (GAECs); they also have to keep unchanged the existing permanent pasture). 
Pillar II sets the long-term objectives and the priorities for the rural development in the EU. Farmers’ 
investments in biogas plants are co-funded by Member States, with the purpose of helping the 
diversification of farms’ income by reducing their investment costs. Thanks to the co-funding, farmers 
facing uncertainty can plan their entry into the agroenergy market [24,25]. On 21 July 2014, Tuscany’s 
RDP 2014–2020 was approved. While the RDP 2007–2013 covered no measure with the purpose of 
boosting agroenergy in Tuscany [26], the new multi-annual programme 2014–2020 addresses the energy 
priority through seven measures designed to meet climate change mitigation objectives and to promote 
the transition toward a bioeconomy. The two measures are (i) investments in physical assets and  
(ii) agri-environment-climate. The former concerns the co-funding mechanism intended for covering the 
investment costs; the latter involves lump payments per hectare. SRF is expected to be one of the main 
agro-environmental climatic measures in the medium-long term. Our work aims at assessing the impacts 
of the measures (i) investments in physical assets and (ii) agri-environment-climate in the province of 
Pisa (Tuscany, Italy). 
3. Methodology 
Cultivating energy feedstock and implementing agroenergy plants on farm embodies a strategy for 
increasing a farm’s profit. The strategy can be modelled as an extension of the optimisation models, 
based on mathematical programming. In recent years, the taxonomy of models based on mathematical 
modelling has grown thanks to research in the fields of agricultural and applied economics. In this paper, 
we apply a dynamic model based on mathematical programming in order to test the impact of alternative 
policy measures within both pillars of the CAP 2104–2020. The application of mathematical 
programming is consolidated as a method to assess policy impacts by simulating changes in relevant 
policy and market parameters [27]. 
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We simulated the impacts of the CAP 2014–2020 on either the implementation of an anaerobic 
digester on farm or on the cultivation of SRC for selling the feedstock on the market. Both alternatives 
can be modelled as investment choices, considering an initial investment cost during the first year, and 
a multi-annual horizon of income. The decision variables of both alternatives are affected by uncertainty 
and irreversibility [28]. With these points in mind, real option models allow a more accurate simulation 
of the process of adoption of one of the two alternatives than other capital budget techniques. This is 
because real option models consider the timing of investments and the option to postpone investments 
due to the investment option value [24,29]. A number of research papers show that uncertainty 
significantly affect farmers’ behaviour. Farmers have an adverse attitude towards risk, so they are keener 
on lower income but safer strategies than on more profitable but more unsecure options [6]. 
Moving from the policy framework, we simulated farmers’ decisions either to implement a biogas 
plant on farm or to allocate part of their farmland to SRC over two time spans, i.e., 2013–2019 and  
2020–2040. We assumed that over the period 2013–2019, farmers know all parameters that can be 
affected by their decision, while for the period 2020–2040, they are uncertain about energy and feedstock 
prices on the market. In case of irreversible and uncertain investments, the real option approach allows 
to consider the deferring of the investment to the second period as an option. Following [29] and [25], 
the optimal farm strategy is the one that maximise the expected NPV, among the two alternatives 
diversified by the timing of investment. Formally, ( )21,max* NPVNPVNPV = where: 
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Where: 
cft = cash flows of a generic year t, with t = t1 or t = t2 if the years belong to the first or to the second 
time span, respectively; 
k = cost of the investments in RE; 
i = discount rate; 
γ = probability to benefit of a state of nature favourable to the adoption of RE; 
2tcf = cash flow, assuming a state of nature favourable to the adoption of RE; 
2tcf  = cash flow, assuming a state of nature unfavourable to the adoption of RE; 
§ = subscript indicating a decision taken.  
The model assumes that farmers know both the probabilities of favourable or unfavourable state of 
natures and the variance of uncertainty variables. A farmer can invest in RE at some point during the 
first period and stay in line with that decision in the second period. Alternatively, the farmer can wait 
for a favourable or unfavourable state of nature to make a safer decision with less uncertainty. Hence, 
basing on the expected value of the stochastic parameters, farmers make the investment in the first period 
in case of a higher NPV1, while they prefer to wait and make decision once they know the state of nature 
when NPV2 is higher. The difference between the two NPV represent the option value that measure the 
increase of investment profitability when a decision is postponed. 
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The decision to invest in RE is affected by uncertainty due to (i) energy price fluctuations at the 
consumption level; (ii) availability and cost of digest biomass alternative to energy crops (e.g., agriculture 
residues or by-products of the food industry); (iii) limits and costs for the disposal of the digestate;  
(vi) price paid to farmers for selling the energy; (v) cost of the agricultural inputs used in production 
process, i.e., labour costs; and (vi) prices of the agricultural commodities.  
We assume two stochastic variables, i.e., labour costs and prices of the agricultural products. Bartolini 
and Viaggi (2012) suggest that both low labour cost and low prices of the agricultural products are 
favourable conditions for farmers’ decisions to enter the agroenergy market. In contrast, high labour 
costs and high prices of the agricultural products can both be considered unfavourable conditions,  
as they are able to reduce the propensity to invest in RE and [6,25]. 
4. Model Specification 
4.1. Farm Model Specification 
We developed the model by applying a simplification of the farm-household model. Following [30], 
a farm’s strategy relies on the choice of the optimal allocation of all productive factors between either 
on-farm or off-farm inputs. The allocation aims at getting enough utility in terms of consumption ( *C ) 
and leisure time ( *L ). The decision to supply RE and to cultivate the needed feedstock on a farm may 
be considered as the decision to allocate the agricultural inputs to these activities, which draws on a 
farm’s strategy that is aimed at pursuing the highest possible NPV of the cash flows. High NPV 
guarantees adequate levels of utility with regard to consumption ( 'C ), leisure, and rest ( 'L ), thus 
affecting the allocation of labour, capital endowments and land demand. As a result, the optimal cash 
flow ( *tcf ) is equal to the sum of on-farm ( tonfarmΠ ) and off-farm incomes ( t farmffoΠ ) plus the savings from 
the year t–1 ( 1−ts ). Formally: 
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On-farm income results from the sum of the income generated through the selling of crops ( tcπ ), milk 
( tmπ ), and energy surpluses (
t
eπ ), plus the payments under Pillar I, i.e., the basic payment ( tBP ), the 
greening payment ( tGP ), and the agri-environmental climate payment ( tAECP ), the loan (if needed) to 
cover the investments in RE, minus the costs for purchasing labour off-farm (C t l ), the costs  
for the household energy use ( tebC ), and the investment costs in RE in case of a favourable  
decision (§ ). Formally:  
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Off-farm income results from the sum of the financial income ( tFin ) from investments in non-agricultural 
activities, the income from household labour in off-farm activities ( tOin ), and the annual cost of the loan 
(if present) to cover the investment in RE adjusted for the interests ( tkloan ). Formally: 
tttt
farmof OinkloanFin ++=Π . (6)
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4.2. Simulation of Investment in RE 
We considered five kinds of anaerobic digesters and two types of SRCs. The five digesters (B1–B5) 
differ for the potential energy release (from 108 to 972 kW/h), for the investment costs, for the annual 
maintenance costs and for the labour requirements. The two SRCs (SRC1–SRC2) differ for plant 
intensity, for the tournament length, for the labour requirements, for the investment costs, and for the 
annual fixed costs. Table 1 summarises the main parameters used for simulations.  
Table 1. Main parameters used in the simulation. 
Parameters 
Biogas plant * SRC ** 
BP1 BP2 BP3 BP4 BP5 SRC1 SRC2 
Investment costs (€) 1,578,000 1,955,000 2,192,000 2,320,000 3,700,000 3200 2300 
Duration (years) 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Harvest and selling of 
trunks (frequency of  
the tournament) 
- - - - - 
Every 3 
years 
Every 5 
years 
Annual costs (€) 200,000 350,000 400,000 550,000 600,000 850 720 
Labur requirements 
(hours/year/ha) 
50 70 80 100 150 23 14 
Potential energy  
release (kW) 
108 191 254 526 972 - - 
Yield (t/ha/year) - - - - - 22 16 
* The parameters used are from[25,31]; ** The parameters used are from [32–34]; SRC1 is the more intensive 
forestry system and SRC2 is the less intensive. 
Following [6] and [25], both RE strategies are modelled as irreversible choices over a multi-annual 
plan. Hence, given that the choice is made in year t, the investment should be maintained over the 
upcoming years (t+1) and until the end of the reference period. Even though the model could seem quite 
static, the proposed approach simulate the right timing for the investment, i.e., the investment cost in 
year t and the yield or the amount of energy produced since when the investment has been made.  
This model allows also to opt for making an investment in the first period and quitting it in the second 
time span, under a different state of nature. In addition, this model allows a better inclusion of the 
financial constraints into the simulation. When the savings from the previous years are not enough to be 
invested, the model simulate the option of covering the investment costs by means of a loan. As a result, 
uncertainty in relevant decision variables, the amount and the kind of the financial support received  
(e.g., lump sum, co-funding) have a prominent role in making an investment a profitable one. 
4.3. Selection of Representative Farming Systems 
The model was tested on the most representative farms of the province of Pisa (Tuscany, Italy), that 
we chose by means of a cluster analysis on official data from the Italian Census 2010 about the farming 
systems in Tuscany. We applied the cluster analysis on a subsample of Italian farms made of all 6760 
farms of the province of Pisa. We selected that study area as RE are not widespread despite the 
availability of marginal land and of land that is suitable for SRF due to pedoclimatic features and water 
Energies 2015, 8 1065 
 
 
availability (40% utilised agricultural area (UAA) of the province of Pisa [13]). Arable, vegetable and 
livestock farming are the main farming systems of the studied area. The cluster analysis that we applied 
on those three farming systems returned 19 representative clusters of farms. Table 2 shows the main 
features and the frequencies of the clusters within the database. 
Clusters were then classified using the following criteria: (i) farmland surface area; (ii) amount of 
household and/or off-farm labour employed; (iii) number of livestock; and (iv) amount of payments and 
entitlements. The first eight clusters cover most arable farms. Those clusters are highly different in terms 
of land size and amount SFP. Clusters number 4, 5, 6 and 7 involve part-time farming, having less than 
one full-time equivalent (FTE) worker from household labour. Clusters number 9, 10 and 11 practice 
vegetable farming. Even though their farmland is smaller than the arable farms, the vegetable clusters 
allocate higher amounts of household labour to on farm activities. The vegetable clusters get lower SFPs 
and have fewer entitlements than the arable clusters. Clusters from number 12 to number 19 cover 
livestock farms, which differ for the number of livestock. The breeding system is not homogenous, 
ranging from more extensive (e.g., eight LU over more than 200 ha UAA) to more intensive farming 
(e.g., 168 LU over less than 60 ha UAA). The 19 clusters differ for their distribution frequency over the 
surface area of the province of Pisa, with clusters number seven and six showing the highest frequencies 
(42% and 16% farms, respectively). Clusters number 2, 3, 18 and 19 also show significant frequencies. 
Data from the Italian Census 2010 highlight that RE are barely spread among all clusters, with no biogas 
plant being implemented in relatively recent years and SRF being practiced on few hectares by cluster 
number 15 only. 
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Table 2. Features and frequencies of the clusters. 
Cluster 
code 
Type of 
farming 
UAA 
(ha) 
Rented 
land (ha) 
Labour 
Dairy Cows 
(LU ** #) 
SFP  
(€ Per Farm) 
Entitlements 
(# Per Farm) 
Renewable Energy 
Frequency of  
cluster 
From household 
(FTE * #) 
External wage  
earners (FTE * #) 
SRC  
(ha) 
Biogas  
(#) 
1 arable 116 71 1.66 - - 29,234.60 70 - - 0.025 
2 arable 193.54 143.54 1.66 - - 41,820.40 50 - - 0.015 
3 arable 72 27 1.45 - - 23,834.00 65 - - 0.052 
4 arable 6.15 - 0.82 0.82 - - - - - 0.006 
5 arable 2292.08 - - 0.75 - - - - - 0.001 
6 arable 17 - 0.91 - - 5833.00 21 - - 0.167 
7 arable 2.6 - 0.48 - - 181.2 1 - - 0.425 
8 arable 36.5 - 1.36 - - 12,716.80 31 - - 0.083 
9 vegetable 18.33 5.68 1.59 0.44 - 2210.10 16 - - 0.006 
10 vegetable 1.11 - 1.64 - - - - - - 0.055 
11 vegetable 7 3 1.82 0.53 - 319.4 2 - - 0.012 
12 livestock 153.96 - 3.02 - 128 27,308.80 120 - - 0.004 
13 livestock 1.3 - 1.66 - 2 - - - - 0.074 
14 livestock 52.33 15.43 1.94 - 32 7817.80 53 - - 0.017 
15 livestock 259.12 - - 2.82 168 - - - 5.4 0.003 
16 livestock 78.24 8.05 2.75 - 56 11,009.60 56 - - 0.013 
17 livestock 35.43 6.73 3.66 - 62 234.1 1 - - 0.006 
18 livestock 7.02 1.75 2.25 - 13 2613.80 4 - - 0.012 
19 livestock 20 - 1.66 - 24 4546.80 16 - - 0.024 
(*) FTE: Full Time Equivalent; (**) LU: Livestock unit; (#): Number. 
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4.4. Scenario Analysis  
The paper analyses the impact of the CAP 2014–2020 on the decision of the farmers from the province 
of Pisa (Tuscany, Italy) to enter the agroenergy market, by simulating two alternative options:  
(i) implementing a biogas plant on farm and selling energy on the market or (ii) allocating a share of 
their farmland to SRC and selling the feedstock on the market RE energy from dedicated feedstocks. We 
identified five policy scenarios, each framing a different combination of some features of the selected 
measures of CAP’s first and second pillar. We provide an operational definition for the scenarios 
implemented through the model, as well as each scenario’s specification.  
Five policy scenarios were identified by combining the parameters related to the mentioned policies: 
(i) Baseline 2005; (ii) CAP-post 2013; (iii) Full Convergence in 2015; (iv) Full convergence in 2020; 
and (v) CAP abolishment (Table 3). 
Table 3. Policy parameters for each scenario. 
Scenario 
Baseline  
2005(BA) 
Post 2013  
CAP(BA1) 
Full convergence 
2015 (RE1) 
Full Convergence  
2019 (RE2) 
CAP-Abolishment 
(NO) 
SFP 
mechanism 
Historical Regionalised Regionalised Regionalised No payments 
Entitlements 
Current 
entitlements 
No entitlement, 
payment per  
eligible area 
No entitlement, 
payment per 
eligible area 
No entitlement, 
payment per  
eligible area 
No entitlements 
Amount of 
SFP or BP 
Current 
payments 
Irish model (partial 
convergence at 2020) 
179 € per ha  
since 2015 
Baseline until  
year 2019 and  
then 179 € per ha 
No payments 
Value of  
the BP 
- 
58% of  
national ceiling 
58% of national 
ceiling 
58% of national 
ceiling 
No payments 
Convergence - Partial to 2019 Full 2015 Full 2019 No payments 
Eligible land COP(*) only All crops All crops All crops No eligible crops 
Cross 
compliance 
Existing Existing Existing Existing Abolishment 
Greening No-greening 
30% of basic 
payments 
30% of basic 
payments 
30% of basic 
payments 
No-greening 
(*) COP: Cereals, oilseeds and protein crops. 
The Baseline scenario (BA) includes the measures under the CAP ante-2013. The reference year is 
2005, when a hundred per cent decoupling was in place. Under BA, we assume the SPS, with 
endowments being allocated on a historical basis, besides cross compliance. No additional measure of 
the CAP 2014–2020 is considered. 
The CAP post-2013 scenario (BA1) frames the new model adopted by Italy and originates from the 
system of payments’ partial convergence in 2019 (“Irish model”).  
The two “regionalisation” scenarios, i.e., RE1 and RE2, simulate the introduction of the regionalised 
SPS as an alternative to the Irish model. While RE1 simulates the full convergence in 2015, RE2 
encompasses the full convergence in 2020. RE1 and RE2 differ for the amount of SFP and for the year 
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when the regionalised payment would be adopted. RE1 and RE2 were the two main policy options for 
the CAP post-2013.  
Under the “CAP-abolishment” scenario (NO), we assume that the CAP would cease to exist by the 
end of 2013, with no CAP’s measure being in place from 1 January 2014. 
Cross compliance mechanism is maintained in all scenarios with payments. Some authors pointed out 
that major constraints related to cross-compliance encompass manure spread and the maintenance of 
permanent pasture, while other constraints are minor (i.e., compliance costs are about 5–10 €/ha) [35,36]. 
Tuscany’s RDP ante-2013 included no measure supporting agroenergy. Due to “Europe 2020” 
priorities, the new RDP 2014–2020 encompasses two measures explicitly aimed sustaining the diffusion 
of RE from agriculture. The measures are (i) investments in physical assets (art.17) and  
(ii) agri-environment-climate (art.28) [26] and are based on different policy instruments. The former 
involves the co-funding of the investment costs to set up agroenergy plants, e.g., biogas plants; the latter 
foresees annual payments per hectare of land allocated to energy feedstock production, e.g., SRC.  
Our purpose was to disentangle the impact of the shift to the new BPS from the impact of the two rural 
development measures; thus, firstly we simulated policy scenarios without considering the new RDP 
measures and then we performed a sensitivity analysis of the introduction of the two new  
policy instruments.  
5. Results 
The outcomes of our model are shown in Tables 4–6. Table 4 displays the results of the simulations 
per cluster. The sensitivity analyses of the impacts of the co-funding measure and of the support to  
agro-environmental climate practices show differences among clusters. Tables 5 and 6 show the results 
of the sensitivity analysis of the impacts of the former and of the latter measure, respectively.  
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Table 4. Baseline (data per cluster). 
Cluster 
BA BA1 RE1 RE2 NO 
NPV UAA bp (*) SRC NPV UAA bp (*) SRC NPV UAA bp (*) SRC NPV UAA bp (*) SRC NPV UAA bp (*) SRC 
1 2,888,630 124 - - 2,198,106 124 - - 2,233,115 124 - - 2,880,933 124 - - 2,131,088 122 1 ξ  - 
2 3,298,760 191 - - 2,950,047 201 - - 3,036,854 201 - - 3,304,786 193 - - 2,430,885 201 - - 
3 1,249,107 76 - - 1,973,032 80 - - 1,980,608 80 - - 2,376,761 80 - - 773,271 71 - - 
4 361,049 15 - - 451,221 16 - - 451,221 16 - - 592,538 16 - - 361,049 15 - - 
5 3,202,521 2,297 - - 4,901,605 2,297 - - 4,971,231 2,297 - - 5,659,079 2,297 - - 3,202,521 2,297 - - 
6 599,782 26 - - 563,452 25 - 0.35 671,221 25 - - 889,631 25 - - 466,575 20 - - 
7 361,388 3 - - 501,888 13 - - 530,855 13 - 0.06 528,187 14 - 0.06 352,730 3 - - 
8 706,627 37 - - 1,142,491 49 1 - 859,913 37 - 0.10 1,117,104 37 - 0.10 689,662 37 - - 
9 819,339 25 - - 879,254 27 - - 952,207 27 - - 861,813 20 - - 786,546 24 - - 
10 275,596 1 - - 484,943 11 - - 496,596 11 - - 461,805 10 - - 275,596 1 - - 
11 584,789 7 - - 879,253 16 - - 925,282 16 - - 1,019,329 16 - - 527,657 7 - - 
12 4,398,473 160 - - 4,438,359 154 - - 4,629,134 154 - - 5,445,997 154 - - 3,967,555 154 - - 
13 377,244 2 - - 569,392 9 - - 585,030 9 - - 992,964 9 - - 369,353 2 - - 
14 1,184,288 51 - - 1,186,323 53 - 0.02 1,713,684 55 - - 1,519,659 52 - - 1,026,142 51 - - 
15 1,168,274 264 - 0.16 6,271,889 292 1 ξ  0.25 ξ  5,317,231 292 1 ξ  0.28 ξ  6,842,570 292 1 0.12 1,168,274 264 - 0.16 
16 2,275,871 74 - - 2,207,690 81 - - 2,402,875 85 - - 2,940,770 81 - - 2,129,823 74 - - 
17 2,225,381 37 - - 1,967,230 37 - - 3,445,427 44 - - 2,505,229 41 - - 2,107,058 36 - - 
18 603,188 8 - - 712,761 17 - - 712,670 17 - - 963,177 16 - - 529,857 7 - - 
19 1,062,970 21 - - 1,726,388 29 - - 1,734,903 29 - - 942,914 28 - - 784,373 20 - - 
ξ = decision taken during the first period (NPV1 > NPV2). 
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Table 5. The diffusion of SRC consistent with the introduction AECP (UAA allocated to SRC).  
Cluster 
BA BA1 RE1 RE2 NO 
0 100 200 300 0 100 200 300 0 100 200 300 0 100 200 300 0 100 200 300 
1 - - - 0.05 - - - 0.15 - - - 015 - - - - - - - 0.15 
2 - - 0.02 0.29 ξ  - - 0.03 0.29 - - - 0.20 - - - - - - - 0.17 
3 - - - - - - - 0.24 - - - 0.24 - - - - - - - 0.22 
4 - - - 0.15 - - - - - - - - - - - 0.14 ξ  - - - 0.14 
5 - - 0.13 0.29 ξ  - - 0.13 0.29 ξ  - - 0.13 0.29 ξ  - - - - - - 0.13 0.29 ξ  
6 - - 0.01 - 0.15 0.15 0.18 ξ  0.19 ξ  - - 0.18 0.19 - - 0.19 0.19 - - 0.18 0.19 
7 - - 0.01 0.13 - - - - 0.06 0.13 0.05 ξ  0.13 ξ  0.16 0.19 0.19 0.22 - - - 0.26 
8 - - - - - - 0.21 0.21 0.10 0.19 0.23 0.25 0.10 0.19 0.21 0.21 - - 0.21 0.21 
9 - - - 0.36 - - 0.24 0.24 - - 0.24 0.24 - - 0.22 0.22 - - 0.23 0.24 
10 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
11 - - 0.01 - - - 0.07 0.08 - - 0.07 0.09 - - - - - - 0.05 0.07 
12 - - 0.09 0.28 - - 0.30 0.38 - - 0.30 0.12 ξ  - - - 0.13 - - 0.24 0.39 
13 - - - - - - - 0.16 - - - - - - - 0.16 - - - - 
14 - - - - 0.02 0.14 0.36 0.36 - - 0.36 0.36 - - 0.38 0.37 - - 0.08 0.06 
15 0.16 0.10 ξ  0.10 ξ  0.10 ξ  0.25 ξ  0.28 ξ  0.33 ξ  0.42 ξ  0.28 ξ  0.31 ξ  0.37 ξ  0.46 ξ  0.12 0.15 0.09 ξ  0.09 ξ  0.16 0.10 ξ  0.10 ξ  0.10 ξ  
16 - - - 0.18 - - - 0.09 - - - - - - - 0.37 - - - 0.17 
17 - - - - - - 0.09 0.09 - - 0.09 0.09 - - - - - - 0.02 0.02 
18 - - - - - - - 0.00 - - 0.00 - - - - - - - 0.06 0.04 
19 - - - - - - 0.15 0.16 - - - - - - - - - - 0.02 0.02 
ξ = Decision taken during the first period (NPV1 > NPV2). 
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Table 6. Diffusion of biogas plants in case of alternative co-funding measures (Number of plants). 
Cluster
BA BA1 RE1 RE2 NO 
0 0.25 0.50 0.75 0 0.25 0.50 0.75 0 0.25 0.50 0.75 0 0.25 0.50 0.75 0 0.25 0.50 0.75 
1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 1 1 ξ  1 ξ  
2 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 1 ξ  - - - - 
3 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
4 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
5 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
6 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
7 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
8 - - - - 1 1 ξ  1 ξ  1 ξ  1 1 ξ  1 ξ  1 ξ  - - - - - - - - 
9 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
10 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
11 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
12 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
13 - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 1 1 ξ  1 ξ  - - - - 
14 - - - - - - 1 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
15 - - - - 1 ξ  1 ξ  1 ξ  1 ξ  1 ξ  1 ξ  1 ξ  1 ξ  1 1 1 ξ  1 ξ      
16 - - - - - - - - - 1 1 1 ξ  - - - - - - - - 
17 - - - - - - - - - 1 1 1 ξ  - - - - - - 1 1 
18 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
19 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
ξ = Decision taken during the first period (NPV1 > NPV2). 
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Our results show that under BA entering the agroenergy market would be profitable for cluster 
number 15 only, which would be eager to allocate a relatively high share of UAA to SRC. Cluster number 
15’s demand for land would consequently increase due to the profitability of SRC as a farming activity. 
Cluster number 15 would decide to implant the SRC in the first period rather than in the second one, 
hence, the simulated uncertainties do not seem to affect the cluster’s decision. Under BA, cluster 15 gets 
no CAP payment and does not need to allocate any land to COP to earn the entitlements. According to 
our results, all clusters, but number 15, are not willing to change their production systems or to get 
involved into the agroenergy market. Under BA, the model show amounts of UAA relatively close to 
the current surface of land operated, thus returning a quite reliable model validation.  
Moving to Ba1, that mirrors the CAP post-2013 reform, the model show that three clusters (C6, C14, 
C15) would decide to increase the share of land allocated to SRC and that two clusters (C8, C15) would 
decide to implement a biogas plant on farm. The models show different timings for the adoption of the 
new activities at the clusters’ level. While cluster 15 would decide for prompt adoptions of both biogas 
plant and SRC, cluster 8 would decide to implement a biogas plant in the second period and clusters 6 
and 14 would decide to implant a the SRC in the second period as well. The outcomes of the model show 
that clusters 14, 15, and 6 would allocate different shares of UAA to SRC, respectively 2%, 25% and 
35%. With respect to cluster 15, the decision to implement a biogas plant can be explained with the 
availability payments under Pillar I. The BP is a source of liquidity ready to be reinvested in agriculture, 
thus allowing to avoid loans. Cluster 8’s unitary entitlements are over 30% reference payment; such a 
high BP payment raises the willingness to pay for additional land to be cultivated with feedstock for 
biogas production.  
The “regionalised” scenarios (RE1, RE2) show the outcomes of two alternative systems of BP 
convergence. The model highlight few differences between RE1 and RE2 due to the levelling of the BPs 
in 2020. The shift to regionalised payments would raise the profitability of SRC for two arable clusters 
(C7, C8) and for a livestock cluster (C15). Clusters 7 and 8 show a 12 hectare reduction in the operated 
land. Cluster number 8 would decide rather to allocate a share of its UAA to SRC than to implement a 
biogas plant on farm, due to lower unitary payments during the first period which bring the willingness 
to pay for additional land down. For cluster 7 cultivating SRC on a notable share of UAA would not be 
profitable until the beginning of the second period, due to higher payments. Cluster 15 only would find 
both options (i.e., dedicating a share of the UAA to SRC and implementing a biogas plant on farm) 
profitable at the same time; however, the two options would be set in place with different timings.  
In fact, RE2 do not encompass any payment within the first period; the subsequent decrease in farmers’ 
liquidity would negatively affect their decision to undertake timely investments. On the contrary,  
under RE1, cluster number 15 would invest in biogas plants in the first period. 
Moving to CAP-abolishment scenario (NO), our results show that farms within cluster 1 only would 
find profitable to implement a biogas plant on farm. With no CAP, farms would reduce the share of 
UAA dedicated to COP, due both to the lack of entitlements and to the abolishment of cross-compliance 
commitments, such as, for example, the maintenance of permanent grassland and nitrogen uses 
constraints. The lack of those compulsory commitments and the less profitability of COP decrease the 
opportunity cost of the cultivation of feedstock for biogas plants.  
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Table 5 displays the effects of the introduction of payments in support to SRC under the measure  
“agro-environmental climate” of the RDP 2014–2020, in terms of percentage of UAA allocated to SRC 
per farm.  
The introduction of AECP can significantly boost the diffusion of SRC in the farms of the province 
of Pisa. Conversely, SRC struggles to spread without the payments. 
According to the results of our work, the policy scenario is able to affect the attractiveness of SRC 
for farmers, as level of support is tightly linked to the SPS applied. Hence, thanks to the introduction of 
the AECP, BA1 would raise the share of land allocated to SRC per farm. SRC would increase in most 
arable clusters, i.e., C1, C2, C3, C5, C6. Those clusters are sensitive to the AECP measure and gradually 
increase the share of SRC within their UAA. Clusters 1 to 3 would decide to allocate a share of UAA to 
SRC in the second period, while clusters number 5 and 6 would adopt the new type of farming in the 
first time span, due to high payments. Waiting to see how the state of nature evolves would be less 
profitable with higher AECPs, thus determining a more timely decision. Farms owing to cluster 5 would 
promptly adopt SRC, as during the first period their type farming had allowed payments; the resultant 
liquidity would be used to realise an investment.  
Due to the higher returns for vegetable and fodder crops, SRC is viable over marginal land or in case 
of higher payments per hectare UAA only. As a result, SRC is barely spread among livestock and 
vegetable clusters. Only raising the payments up to 300 € per hectare would boost the diffusion of SRC.  
The outcomes of the model show that the shift from the historical to the regional model and higher 
AECPs would make more profitable to anticipate the investments in SRC, even if the share of UAA 
allocated to SRC is low. In fact, waiting for the state of nature to evolve has no option value.  
For clusters number 5, 7, 12, and 15, higher payments would allow to anticipate the adoption of SRC 
in the first period, as the investment would be more profitable and uncertainty would not significantly 
affect the profitability.  
The results of our research suggest that the abolishment of the CAP (NO) would be able to promote 
the diffusion of SRC only if tied to a simultaneous raise in AECPs. Providing SRC with higher support 
would help this type of farming to widespread, while lowering COP’s profitability. Linking NO with 
higher AECPs would raise up to 39% the share of UAA that arable clusters allocate to SRC.  
Table 6 displays the effects of the co-funding measure (article 17) of Tuscany’s RDP 2014–2020 [26] 
on the decision of the farms of the province of Pisa (Tuscany, Italy) to implement a biogas plant on farm. 
Our results show the ability of that policy measure to boost the implementation of biogas plants on farm 
and agree with the findings of [25]. Under the conditions of our simulation, the co-funding measure 
would lead only arable and livestock clusters to build biogas plants on farm. Under Ba1, clusters 8 and 
15 only would find such an investment profitable, assuming a low share of co-funding; however, the 
investments would have different timings. A higher share of co-funding would improve the timing of 
the adoption of the new technology. The combination of an increased confidence provided by the BPs 
with lower investment costs reduce farmers’ uncertainty. Our results suggest that raising the co-funding 
to 50% investment costs would make the implementation of a biogas on farm profitable for cluster 14 as 
well. However, the investment should be delayed to the second period.  
Under both “regionalised” scenarios, most livestock farms would find profitable to implement an 
anaerobic digester on farm even with low share of co-funding. The analysis of both scenarios illustrates 
that increasing the level of co-funding to 50% investment costs would raise the profitability of biogas 
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plants for  
cluster 2 as well. A further increase to 75% investment costs would anticipate the decision to adopt the 
biogas plant in the first period. 
Compared to the SPS, the payment based on the regionalised model would grant more extensive farms 
higher payments. In fact, under that scheme the entitlements are allocated for each hectare UAA; as a 
result, investing in the implementation of an anaerobic digester on farm would be more profitable for 
extensive than for intensive farms. According to our results, the implementation of a biogas plant on 
farm depend on the availability and on the amount of payments under Pillar I. The payments allow 
liquidity that is ready to be reinvested. Our work confirm the research findings of [25]. Our results show 
that no cluster, but numbers 1 and 17, would find profitable to invest in biogas plants. Clusters 1 and 7 
would find such an investment profitable due to the abolishment of some cross-compliance requirements, 
i.e., the maintenance of natural grassland and the limits on the spread of manure fixed by a ratio between 
the number of livestock and the hectares of UAA).  
6. Discussion 
On 1 January 2015 the CAP 2014–2020 would be in place. Thus, to date, we have observed the 
outcomes of the CAP 2007–2013, drawn on the 2003 reform. Mainly, the CAP ante-2013 was designed 
to open the market to European agricultural products and to remove the coupled payments. Even though 
that policy involved the promotion of RE, to date the spread of agroenergy in Tuscany is extremely low. 
According to the Italian Census 2010, no biogas plant is operated within the province of Pisa and SRC 
is practiced on few hectares only. The CAP 2007–2013 missed a measure aimed at promoting the 
bioeconomy and agroenergy as a way to boost the multifunctionality of agriculture.  
The results of our research confirm that under the CAP ante-2013 few farm types only were interested 
in entering the agroenergy market, even in case of specific payments or co-funding systems. That was 
mainly due the lack of liquidity for financing the investment; actually, the farms operated within a costly 
and imperfect capital market. Farmers’ lack of interest in agroenergy was also due to the allocation of 
entitlement on a historical basis, which raised COP’s profitability. 
The European growth strategy towards 2020 strongly supports the bioeconomy and the diffusion of 
agroenergy. Drawing on “Europe 2020”, the CAP 2014–2020 sustains agroenergies. According to our 
results, investing in agroenergy would become a profitable option for the farmers of the province of Pisa 
(Tuscany, Italy) due to higher liquidity. The profitability is even higher for those farms which are being 
awarded BP entitlments for the first time. That is because the a hundred per cent old historical 
entitlements would be replaced by new “regional” entitlements. One entitlement would be allocated for 
each hectare of UAA.  
The model results highlight that cultivating SRC as a cash crop to be sold to the agroenergy market 
is a viable strategy for farmers that operate under uncertain inputs’ costs or outputs’ prices; that strategy 
allows higher income stability and lowering the dependence on the seasonality and the fluctuation  
of prices.  
With respect to arable farms, SRC is a relevant option for differentiating the production while 
complying with the “greening” requirements. However, for those farms investing in anaerobic digesters 
on farm is less profitable than for the livestock farms, whereby potential demand for biogas plants is 
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relatively high. Having a biogas plant on farm can benefit livestock farmers by allowing them to use 
manure and slurry as feedstocks for the digester. Feeding the digester with such byproducts avoid land 
use competition by first generation energy crops. However, the implementation of a biogas plant on farm 
does not solve the issue of adding value to marginal land, when the farm uses livestock byproducts as 
feedstock. The ability to add value to marginal land has been one of the main arguments in favour of the 
diffusion of biogas [13]. 
The provision of a static picture is a methodological flaw of our approach. This avoids the proper 
simulation of all the dynamics that drive the changes in land prices, as the model is based on fixed 
parameters. An increase in land demand for energy feedstocks affects the rental prices of land. 
Cultivating land with energy feedstocks allows a supply for agroenergy plants. An increase in the 
willingness to pay for land to be cultivated with biomass intended for supplying biogas plants would 
increase land rental prices; an additional outcome is the high probability of an increasee in the cost of 
energy feedstocks.  
Moreover, the static nature of the model does not allow a clear picture of the contribution of the 
measures under Tuscany’s RDP 2014–2020 to the diffusion of agroenergy in the province of Pisa for 
two main reasons. Firstly, we assumed that Tuscan farmers would not compete for RDP funds. Secondly, 
we presumed no transaction costs, such as participation costs, that could prevent farmers to apply for 
RDP funds. When one or both hypotheses are not verified, farmers would fail in getting public support, 
and agroenergy would undergo a sub-optimal diffusion. 
Our research show that most farmers who would invest in agroenergy would take the decision in the 
second of the proposed time spans. This is due to the higher option value of the waiting strategy 
compared to the decision to anticipate the investment. Waiting for a favourable state of nature allows 
higher confidence in the investments. This result is not surprising if we consider that in recent years 
agricultural prices have been affected by high volatility and that agriculture has lower margins than  
other sectors.  
7. Conclusions 
We analysed the potential impact of the CAP post-2013 by simulating the changes in both the first 
and second pillars and prospecting five scenarios. Within Pillar I, we focused on the shift from historical 
to regionalized payments, while within Pillar II, we investigated the introduction of both the  
agri-environmental-climate payments and the co-funding system for investments in biogas plants on farm.  
Our results highlight that the CAP can significantly affect the diffusion of RE and is in line with 
existing research literature. Thus, we confirmed that the policies under both Pillar I and II can help 
farmers entering the agroenergy market and stressed the difference between the adoption of alternative 
types of farming.  
According to our research, the farms owing to the arable cluster would be eager to allocate a share of 
UAA to SRC. Conversely, non-arable farms would rather keep the status quo and consider SRC as a 
mere option for cultivating marginal land. Thus, including SRC in arable farms would be viable. The 
strategy to earn as much as possible from AECPs can lead farms to allocate a high share of their UAA 
to SRC. Within the province of Pisa (Tuscany, Italy), the option to implement an anaerobic digester for 
biogas production on farm is relevant and viable for livestock farms only.  
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The diffusion of renewable energies is among the Europe 2020 objectives. Our research suggests that 
the new instruments of the CAP 2014–2020 can increase the share of renewable energies in Tuscany. 
Our paper highlights that a more liberal strategy at the EU level, with the abolishment of the CAP, would 
lead to even higher shares of RE. Abolishing the CAP would negatively affect the farms’ income,  
thus investing in agroenergy would be strategic to ensure the profitability of the agricultural systems.  
Some positive externalities of biogas plants on farm are as follows: (i) the anaerobic digestion of 
crops residues and manure prevents nutrient leaching; (ii) the agricultural application of the digestate as 
a fertiliser reduces the need for chemical fertilisers; (iii) the solid and fibrous fraction of the digestate 
may be used as a soil conditioner to increase the organic content of depleted soils [37]. 
The main shortcomings of our work are due to the type of agent simulated and to the rigidity of the 
model. We simulated the clusters which are not able take into account farmers’ features and pathways, 
thus failing to take into account all the existing variability within all types of farming of the area under 
study. Consequently, we were not able to highlight the correct farm strategy, as it encompassed taking 
into account the social capital and the networks with other famers. Moreover, we considered two time 
spans. That decision is coherent with the policy framework, but creates rigidity within the model.  
Further research in this field should simulate the decision on an annual basis, thus evaluating the 
decisions about different investment options over multiple time spans. 
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Annex: Nomenclature 
Acronym Meaning Acronym Meaning 
GHG Greenhouse Gas U Utility 
RE Renewable Energy ∏ Income 
EU European Union s Savings 
CAP Common Agricultural Policy GP Greening Payment 
RDP Rural Development Programme AECP 
Agro-environment-climate 
Payment 
BPS Basic Payment Scheme Fin Financial income 
SPS Single Payment Scheme Oin Off-farm activities 
SFP Single Farm Payment kloan 
Annual payment of loan 
received 
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SRF Short Rotation Forestry UAA Utilised Agricultural Area 
SRC Short Rotation Coppice FTE Full-time Equivalent worker 
BP Basic Payment LU Livestock Unit 
NPV Net Present Value BA Baseline scenario 
cf Cash flows BA1 CAP-post 2013 scenario 
K Cost of investments in RE Re1 
Regionalised scenario 1:  
full Convergence in 2015 
I Discount rate Re2 
Regionalised scenario 2:  
full convergence in 2020 
 
Probability to benefit a state of nature 
favourable to the adoption of RE 
NO CAP-abolishment scenario 
§ 
Subscript indicating that  
a decision was taken 
COP 
Cereals, Oilseeds  
and Protein crops 
C Consumption time bp Biogas Plant 
L Leisure time   
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